Monday, October 12, 2015

The Caliphate of Abu Bakr (632-634)

The Caliphate of Abu Bakr (632-634)


Muhammad’s death in 632 seems to have caught his followers by surprise, because the sources describe a period of effective chaos right after he died and I think this is one area in which the sources can be mostly trusted. Yes, the sources are late and unreliable, but if they were doctored up or even completely fabricated at some later time, why would their writers have invented an inter-movement war if none had actually taken place? The impulse for someone inventing, or massaging, the story of the early community would be to write more order and control into that tale, not less. You would want to show how Muhammad’s successor was widely accepted and peacefully installed by the community, not how the whole Arabian project almost fell apart. But, according to these sources, “almost fall apart” is what happened.

By the time of Muhammad’s death he had won the allegiance of, or at least peaceful relations with, many tribes and settlements throughout the Arabian peninsula. This had mostly been accomplished through peaceful means after a few military campaigns in the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Mecca. Basically Muhammad required these tribes and settlements to accept Medina’s sovereignty and to pay taxes to him as well as to serve in his armies, in return for which they were promised protection from Muhammad’s forces as well as a share of the booty taken in any military action–in other words, there seems to have been no requirement that tribes or settlements convert to Islam or even to monotheism before they could make treaties with Muhammad. However, it seems most of those who had made agreements with Muhammad saw themselves as having made agreements with Muhammad the individual, not Muhammad the head of a new political entity (let alone a religious movement) that would continue on after his death. Indeed, it wasn’t even clear to Muhammad’s closest followers that the community should remain together!


The succession process moved very quickly in Medina itself; it had to, or the whole movement risked being shattered. Now, the roots of the Sunni-Shiʿite schism in the Islamic community are, at least in theory, to be found right at the moment of Muhammad’s death, because fundamentally the split came out of a disagreement over who should be his successor:

Shiʿites (the name comes from the Arabic shiʿat ‘Ali, or “partisans of ʿAli”), the minority party, hold that Muhammad formally designated his cousin and son-in-law ʿAli b. Abi Talib as his successor in a sermon he gave at a place called Ghadir Khumm, shortly before his death (in fact, on the return journey to Medina from his pilgrimage to Mecca). Muhammad is reported to have said “For whomever I have been mawla, ʿAli is his mawla.” Mawla can (really, can, see below) mean “patron” or even “master,” so this could be a designation of succession. ʿAli was a seasoned battlefield commander who (according to the sources) usually challenged and defeated the opposing army’s champion before full battle was joined (traditional Arabian warfare started with champion challenges and single combat before progressing to army-on-army fighting). He was the closest thing to a blood heir that Muhammad had, since his wives had all borne him only daughters (one of whom, Fatimah, had married ʿAli). He had maybe been the first male to accept Muhammad’s message and his prophethood, following only Muhammad’s wife Khadijah, although this was disputed.
Sunnis, the majority party, offer several points in defense of the succession of Abu Bakr. One is that Abu Bakr was Muhammad’s acknowledged second-in-command throughout his career as a religious and political leader, and indeed may himself have been the first male to accept Muhammad’s message, or at least the first adult male to do so (though some sources disagree on this as well), as ʿAli was a child when the revelations began and Abu Bakr was probably in his late 30s. They acknowledge Muhammad’s sermon at Ghadir Khumm but contend that he referred to ʿAli as mawla in its other meaning of “close friend” or “spiritual brother,” not “master.” They point to hadith where Muhammad says he leaves two things behind him to guide the community: the Qur’an and his own life example (i.e., not a designated successor, and certainly not ʿAli). Finally, they point to Muhammad’s illness just before his death, when for a time he appointed Abu Bakr, not ʿAli, as imam, to lead the communal prayer in Medina in his place.
It seems to me that ʿAli was disqualified by Muhammad’s other companions out of the fear, which I suppose may have been justified at the time, that if ʿAli succeeded Muhammad their movement would turn into a hereditary monarchy (which it eventually did anyway, but I digress). The Islamic project developed in a tribal society where oligarchy was the typical form of governance, more so than monarchy, so there was an innate fear of establishing a monarchy. While ʿAli did eventually come to rule the community, he was the fourth man to succeed Muhammad and any fear that he would spawn a line of blood succession was no longer credible, or at least no more credible than any fear that any of the three rulers who came before him would have done the same thing (although, low and behold, the guy who succeeded ʿAli did exactly that, but again I digress). Having Abu Bakr succeed Muhammad sent a clear signal that control of the Arabian project would not be passed down a bloodline, at least not yet.

An additional factor feeding the opposition to ʿAli was most likely ʿAli’s popularity among the non-Meccan elements of the movement, like the Medinan ansar, other Arabian tribes, and even the small but growing number of non-Arabs who were being drawn into Muhammad’s followers. Following the conquest of Mecca, the leading positions within the movement had largely come to be occupied by Meccan Quraysh, who may well have feared losing their status had ʿAli, who was himself Quraysh but whose base of support was largely not, come to power.

What sequence of events transpired to bring Abu Bakr to power? Well, as I say Muhammad’s death seems to have shocked the community, at least according to the Islamic historical record. Muhammad wasn’t a young man, particularly for the Arabian environment, and he had been ill, but still it seems his followers either believed that he was somehow divinely protected or that the End of Days would come while he was still alive. At any rate, the despairing community, aware that Muhammad’s condition was grave but unprepared for him to die, seems to have been gathered in the communal mosque in Medina, hearing a sermon by another of Muhammad’s leading followers, Umar b. al-Khattab, when Abu Bakr returned to the city (Muhammad had sent him on a military expedition into Syria but he returned when word reached him of Muhammad’s grave condition). Abu Bakr went first to Muhammad’s house, where he saw Muhammad and pronounced him dead. Umar was angrily berating anyone who said that Muhammad was dead, threatening that God would cut off the hands and legs of anyone saying so (he was clearly in the camp who believed that Muhammad could not die), until Abu Bakr arrived in the mosque and said “those here who worship Muhammad, Muhammad has died, but those who worship God, God is alive and will never die!” This shut Umar up, and calmed a crowd that seems genuinely to have been unable to process Muhammad’s death.

But now, as I said, Abu Bakr and Umar had to work quickly to keep things from coming apart. They, along with a few other leading muhajirun (Muhammad’s followers from Mecca), found a group of leading ansar (Muhammad’s followers from Medina) who were deciding who would lead their community (as in just the ansar) with Muhammad dead. Muhammad’s entire movement could have been splintered then and there had Abu Bakr and Umar not persuaded the ansar leaders not to choose their own leader and go their own way. After all, there was no particular reason to assume that the community would go on as a united entity after Muhammad’s death; some thought he would be succeeded by another prophet, or perhaps a group of prophets, each continuing the movement within his own tribe. Abu Bakr and Umar talked the ansar out of appointing their own leader and thus kept the community together. With the unification question (temporarily) settled, at least in Medina itself, then the group turned to the choice of a successor. Abu Bakr proposed Umar or another muhajir named Abu Ubaydah, both of whom were younger than Abu Bakr and, he argued, fitter for the job, whereupon Umar immediately pledged an oath of loyalty (bay’ah)to Abu Bakr and the rest of the group, swept up in the moment maybe, did the same. The group then began to filter out into the Medinan community to obtain similar oaths from the rest of Muhammad’s followers.

The only remaining problem in Medina was securing the loyalty of ʿAli, and what you believe happened next depends on whether you are a Sunni or a Shiʿite. Shiʿites believe that Umar and Abu Bakr, with what amounts to an armed posse, went to ʿAli and Fatimah’s house, where supporters of ʿAli (many of them ansar) had gathered, to obtain oaths from everyone there. After a confrontation and some verbal sparring between Umar on the one hand and ʿAli and Fatimah on the other, ʿAli’s supporters went into his house and shut the door on Abu Bakr and Umar. Umar had a torch brought and set the wooden door of the house on fire, until it had weakened enough to be smashed open. In the ensuing violence, Umar shoved the pregnant Fatimah so violently as to cause her to miscarry and break ribs, and she died of her injuries within a few days. Sunni tradition simply denies that this event ever took place, saying instead that Fatimah demanded that Abu Bakr promise her Muhammad’s share of war booty, which Abu Bakr refused, and/or that ʿAli complained about not having been consulted as to the succession, but otherwise acquiesced. The interesting complication with respect to the Sunni story is that Fatimah does seem to have died very shortly after her father’s death, coincidentally enough (although if she had really been pregnant at the time then complications in the pregnancy could explain her sudden death), and there are quite a number of sources that attest to some kind of violent clash at ʿAli’s house. What all the sources say is that, after some time out of public view of the deaths of his father-in-law and wife, ʿAli again became a leading figure in the community, participating along with Abu Bakr, Umar, and other leaders in all important decision-making.

So Abu Bakr got the job, taking the title khalifat al-rasul, “successor”–or perhaps “vicegerent”–“of the Messenger,” what we call “caliph” (the full title actually seems to have changed in an important way when the office became hereditary, but we’re not there yet). The manner of his succession established the shura (“consultation”), or decision made in some kind of council of affected parties, as one legitimate form of political succession in the Islamic world. Reza Aslan has likened this to a form of democracy, but I’m not sure I would agree; the decision to make Abu Bakr the leader was clearly made in a council of elite followers, effectively oligarchs, who sought the ratification of the whole community but may well have coerced that ratification to some extent. At the moment he took over, though, Abu Bakr, unlike Muhammad, controlled only Medina and Mecca, where the Quraysh had no more will to fight, but little else. The vast majority of the tribes and cities throughout the rest of Arabia seem to have treated their oaths to Muhammad as personal loyalty oaths to Muhammad himself, rather than pledges of allegiance to a long-lasting community. Most immediately severed ties with Medina, and some even began to follow their own “holy men,” similar in appearance to Muhammad; most notable among these was a man named Musaylima at al-Yamamah in central Arabia, who amassed a considerable following.

Abu Bakr acted swiftly and decisively to regain control in Arabia. First, the army that he had gone with on the expedition to Roman Syria instead moved instantly to crush nascent uprisings in northern Arabia. Meanwhile, Abu Bakr scraped together an army from among the fighting men left at Medina, and defeated a group of rebels who had threatened Medina itself. Then, having established a little order and breathing space, he formed 11 separate armies to take the fight to other parts of Arabia. Collectively the military campaigns that followed are known in Islamic history as the Wars of Apostasy, the Hurub al-Riddah, or the Ridda Wars. The most powerful corps, under the command of Khalid b. al-Walid (who had been Mecca’s military commander in their campaigns against Muhammad but was now a loyal member of the movement), was sent into central Arabia with the ultimate goal of finding and defeating the upstart Musaylima. Khalid moved swiftly across central Arabia, negotiating where he could to peel support away from rebel leaders, while another corps was ordered to advance on Musaylima at al-Yamamah but not to engage him, just to keep him pinned down (the commander of this corps disobeyed his orders, engaged Musaylima, and was defeated). When Khalid and his corps arrived at al-Yamamah, they joined with a third corps that had been sent there as reinforcement and engaged Musaylima’s forces, ultimately slaughtering them. Resistance in central Arabia was ended and the rest of the peninsula (Oman, Bahrayn, the Yemen, the rest of northern Arabia) followed suit, with the last resistance at Hadhramaut (eastern Yemen today) collapsing in early 633.

Abu Bakr is also known for having begun the process of recording Muhammad’s revelations on paper, perhaps out of fear that all those who had carefully memorized the revelations could be killed in battle and then the revelations would be lost. He appointed a committee under Umar and Muhammad’s scribe, a man named Zayd b. Thabit, to collect any scraps upon which people had transcribed Muhammad’s revelations, and to call together those who had memorized them so that they might recite the revelation and have it transcribed. Abu Bakr was supposedly presented with the committee’s final product: a compiled, written Qur’an, which he passed on to Umar and which became the basis for the standardized Qur’an we know today. While this makes for a nice story and may in fact be true, it’s important to note that there’s no way to verify that Abu Bakr had a written Qur’an, or something that would become the written Qurʾan, in his possession; indeed, there’s no verifiable written Qur’an anywhere until the end of the seventh century, but that’s a topic for a later entry. Incidentally, Abu Bakr also stabilized and professionalized the field of “Qurʾan recitation,” appointing trained reciters to minister to tribes all over the peninsula in an effort to ensure that those tribes were all hearing a standardized, “official” version of the revelations.

With all the rebellions in Arabia put down, Abu Bakr turned his attention to the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires on his northwestern and northeastern borders, respectively. He launched campaigns directed at both, or, more accurately, directed at the Arab client/buffer entities that both empires had long patronized along their Arabian borders. It’s likely he hoped to draw these Arab tribes into Medina’s orbit and then push back against the powerful empires and buy Arabia some breathing room, but I doubt he envisioned the kind of all-encompassing Arab military success that would ultimately take place (albeit most of it after he died). He first sent an army, again under the command of Khalid b. al-Walid, into Iraq against the Persians; Khalid conquered the important cities of Hirah and Anbar in central Iraq in 633, then utterly defeated a major Persian counterattack before being recalled by Abu Bakr to lead the campaign against the Romans in Syria. He led his army on a daring march through the Syrian desert to catch the Romans off-guard. First he defeated the Romans’ Arab clients, the Ghassanids, then he routed a Roman army sent against him before besieging and capturing the crucial city of Damascus in 634.

Abu Bakr died in 634, putting a temporary pause on the conquests, but before he died he short-circuited another succession crisis by directly naming Umar b. al-Khattab as his chosen successor. This established direct nomination by a predecessor as a second legitimate form of political succession in Islamic politics.

Source : http://attwiw.com/

Pregnant Palestinian and child die in Israeli air raid

Israeli air raid kills two Palestinian
Israeli air raid kills two Palestinian



Noor Hassan, who was five-months pregnant, along with her three-year-old daughter, killed in air strike near Gaza City.

A Palestinian woman who was five-months pregnant and her three-year-old daughter have been killed in an Israeli air strike east of Gaza City.

Medical sources in the besieged territory said 30-year-old Noor Hassan and her daughter Rahaf died when their house collapsed following an Israeli air strike on a Hamas military training camp near their home.

Three other people were wounded in the attack on Sunday, and Palestinian rescue services are continuing to search under the rubble.

The Israeli army said the air strikes were launched in response to a rocket that was fired into southern Israel. The rocket was reportedly intercepted by Israel's Iron Dome rocket defence system.

The army said that its planes were targeting two Hamas weapons-manufacturing sites in the area.

After the deaths of the mother and child, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, an Israeli army spokesman, said: "The IDF [Israeli army] holds Hamas responsible for any act of aggression from the Gaza Strip."

Car 'explosive'

In a separate incident on Sunday, Israeli police said a Palestinian woman set off an explosive device in the occupied West Bank.

A policeman spotted her vehicle close to the Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim and ordered the 31-year-old woman to stop, police said.

She exited the car and the explosives inside detonated, police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld said, wounding her seriously and the officer lightly.

The woman, from Jericho in the West Bank, shouted "Allahu Akbar" (God is great) before the device went off. It was not clear whether she intended to carry out an attack at that location or elsewhere.

According to photos distributed by police, the explosives did not appear especially powerful, with the car still intact after the blast.

Teenagers killed

On Saturday, Israeli soldiers shot and killed two Palestinian teenagers in the Gaza Strip during confrontations, less than 24 hours after six people were shot dead while protesting along the border with Israel.

The Palestinian Health Ministry said 13-year-old Marwan Barbakh and 15-year-old Omar Othman were shot with live ammunition in eastern Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip.

Medical sources confirmed to Al Jazeera that at least 23 people had been injured in clashes with Israelis across Gaza on Saturday.

The ministry said in a post on FACEBOOK that the total number of Palestinians killed since the start of October now stood at 20, with nine killed in the Gaza Strip, and 11 in the occupied West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem.

The deaths of Noor Hassan and her daughter bring the death toll to 22.

On Friday, Israeli soldiers killed six Palestinians protesting along the border separating the territory from Israel.

Among those killed on Friday was a 15-year-old boy who was fatally shot at a demonstration in the al-Faraheen village, southeast of Gaza City.

The Israeli army claimed there had been "multiple violent attempts to storm the border fence" and "a thousand rioters infiltrated the buffer zone", throwing a "grenade, rocks and rolled burning tyres" at the soldiers".

East Jerusalem deaths

The deaths of the two teenagers in Gaza came shortly after three Palestinians were killed in separate incidents in East Jerusalem after reportedly attacking Israelis.


The dead included a 16-year-old who was shot dead by Israeli police after stabbing two men, and a member of Hamas who opened fire on Israeli paramilitary police during a clash in the Shuafat refugee camp.

Another Palestinian was shot dead after a stabbing attack against Israeli police officers. The incident left three Israeli police officers injured, one seriously after a possible "friendly fire" incident.

A Palestinian who was shot by Israeli forces in Hebron on Thursday succumbed to his injuries two days later.

The Palestinian Ministry of Health said two Palestinians were being treated for head injuries in Bethlehem after being hit by tear gas canisters fired by Israelis during protests there.

Al-Aqsa tensions

The recent violence has been fuelled by Palestinian fears that Israeli hardliners are trying to take control of the al-Aqsa Mosque compound in East Jerusalem, one of Islam's holiest sites.

Those fears have grown after visits by Jewish groups, including politicians, to the site.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted Israel is committed to maintaining the status-quo and has banned his ministers from visiting the site.

Under the current arrangements, Jews are allowed to visit the site but non-Muslim prayer is banned.

Source :Aljazeera

Islam in Australia

Chullora Greenacre Mosque
The Chullora Greenacre Mosque


Islam in Australia is a minority religious affiliation. According to the 2011 census, 476,291 people, or 2.2% of the total Australian population, were Muslims.[1] This made Islam the fourth largest religious grouping, after all forms of Christianity (61.1%), irreligion (22.9%), and Buddhism (2.5%). Demographers attribute Muslim community growth trends during the most recent census period to relatively high birth rates, and recent immigration patterns.[2][3] Adherents of Islam represent the majority of the population in Cocos (Keeling) Islands. Australia's Muslim population is expected to rise to 714,000 by 2030.[4] The vast majority of Muslims in Australia belong to the Sunni denomination, with sizeable Shia and Sufi minorities.[5]

While the Australian Muslim community is defined largely by religious belonging, it is fragmented racially, ethnically, culturally and linguistically.[6] Members of the Australian Muslim community thus also espouse parallel non-religious ethnic identities with related non-Muslim counterparts, either within Australia or abroad.[7]

History

Prior to 1860

Indonesian Muslims trepangers from the southwest corner of Sulawesi visited the coast of northern Australia, "from at least the eighteenth century"[8] to collect and process trepang, a marine invertebrate prized for its culinary and medicinal values in Chinese markets. Remnants of their influence can be seen in the culture of some of the northern Aboriginal peoples. Regina Ganter, an associate professor at Griffith University, says, "Staying on the safe grounds of historical method ... the beginning of the trepang industry in Australia [can be dated] to between the 1720s and 1750s, although this does not preclude earlier, less organised contact." Ganter also writes "the cultural imprint on the Yolngu people of this contact is everywhere: in their language, in their art, in their stories, in their cuisine."[9] According to anthropologist John Bradley from Monash University, the contact between the two groups was a success: "They traded together. It was fair - there was no racial judgement, no race policy." Even into the early 21st century, the shared history between the two peoples is still celebrated by Aboriginal communities in Northern Australia as a period of mutual trust and respect.[10]

Others who have studied this period have come to a different conclusion regarding the relationship between the Aboriginal people and the visiting trepangers. Anthropologist Ian McIntosh[11] has said that the initial effects of the Macassan fishermen were "terrible", which resulted in "turmoil"[12]:65–67 with the extent of Islamic influence being "indeterminate".[12]:76 In another paper McIntosh concludes, "strife, poverty and domination . . is a previously unrecorded legacy of contact between Aborigines and Indonesians."[13]:138 A report prepared by the History Department of the Australian National University says that the Macassans appear to have been welcomed initially, however relations deteriorated when, "aborigines began to feel they were being exploited . . leading to violence on both sides".[14]:81–82

A number of "Mohammedans" were listed in the musters of 1802, 1811, 1822, and the 1828 census, and a small number of Muslims arrived during the convict period. Beyond this, Muslims generally are not thought to have settled in large numbers in other regions of Australia until 1860.[15]:10

Muslims were among the earliest settlers of Norfolk Island while the island was used as a British penal colony in the early 19th century. They arrived from 1796, having been employed on British ships. They left following the closure of the penal colony and moved to Tasmania. The community left no remnants; only seven permanent residents of the island identified themselves as "non-Christian" in a 2006 census.[16][17][18]

1860 to 1900


Among the early Muslims were the "Afghan" camel drivers who migrated to and settled in Australia during the mid to late 19th century. Between 1860 and the 1890s a number of Central Asians came to Australia to work as camel drivers. Camels were first imported into Australia in 1840, initially for exploring the arid interior (see Australian camel), and later for the camel trains that were uniquely suited to the demands of Australia's vast deserts. The first camel drivers arrived in Melbourne, Victoria, in June 1860, when eight Muslims and Hindus arrived with the camels for the Burke and Wills expedition. The next arrival of camel drivers was in 1866 when 31 men from Rajasthan and Baluchistan arrived in South Australia with camels for Thomas Elder. Although they came from several countries, they were usually known in Australia as 'Afghans' and they brought with them the first formal establishment of Islam in Australia.[19]

Cameleers settled in the areas near Alice Springs and other areas of the Northern Territory and inter-married with the Indigenous population. The Adelaide, South Australia to Darwin, Northern Territory, railway is named The Ghan (short for The Afghan) in their memory.[20]

The first mosque in Australia was built in 1861 at Marree, South Australia.[21] The Great Mosque of Adelaide was built in 1888 by the descendants of the Afghan cameleers.

During the 1870s, Muslim Malay divers were recruited through an agreement with the Dutch to work on Western Australian and Northern Territory pearling grounds. By 1875, there were 1800 Malay divers working in Western Australia. Most returned to their home countries.

One of the earliest recorded Islamic festivals celebrated in Australia occurred on 23 July 1884 when 70 Muslims assembled for Eid prayers at Albert Park in Melbourne. “During the whole service the worshippers wore a remarkably reverential aspect.”[22]

1900 to present

In the early 20th century, immigration of Muslims to Australia was restricted to those of European descent, as non-Europeans were denied entry to Australia under the provisions of the White Australia policy. In the 1920s and 1930s Albanian Muslims, whose European heritage made them compatible with the White Australia Policy, immigrated to the country. Albanian Muslims built the first mosque in Shepparton, Victoria in 1960 and the first mosque in Melbourne in 1963.


Modern-day replica of an ice cream van owned by one of the terrorists involved in the Battle of Broken Hill in 1915.
Notable events involving Australian Muslims during this early period include what has been described either as an act of war by the Ottoman Empire, or the earliest terrorist attack planned against Australian civilians.[23] The attack was carried out at Broken Hill, New South Wales, in 1915, in what was described as the Battle of Broken Hill. Two Afghans who pledged allegiance to the Ottoman Empire shot and killed four Australians and wounded seven others before being killed by the police.[24]

Increased immigration

The perceived need for population growth and economic development in Australia led to the broadening of Australia's immigration policy in the post-World War II period. This allowed for the acceptance of a number of displaced Muslims who began to arrive from Europe mainly from the Balkans, especially from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Between 1967 and 1971, approximately 10,000 Turkish citizens settled in Australia under an agreement between Australia and Turkey.

Also, from the 1970s onwards, there was a significant shift in the government's attitude towards immigration. Instead of trying to make newer foreign nationals assimilate and forgo their heritage, the government became more accommodating and tolerant of differences by adopting a policy of multiculturalism.

Larger-scale Muslim migration began in 1975 with the migration of Lebanese Muslims, which rapidly increased during the Lebanese Civil War from 22,311 or 0.17% of the Australian population in 1971, to 45,200 or 0.33% in 1976.[citation needed] Lebanese Muslims are still the largest and highest-profile Muslim group in Australia, although Lebanese Christians form a majority of Lebanese Australians, outnumbering their Muslim counterparts at a 6-to-4 ratio.

By the beginning of the 21st-century, Muslims from more than sixty countries had settled in Australia. While a very large number of them come from Bosnia, Turkey, and Lebanon, there are Muslims from Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Fiji, Albania, Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, the Palestinian territories, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, among others.[citation needed] At the time of the 2011 census, 476,000 Australians (representing 2.2 percent of the population) reported Islam as their religion.[25]

Since the 1990s

Trade and educational links between have been developed Australia and several Muslim countries. Muslim students from countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, are among the thousands of international students studying in Australian universities.[quantify][citation needed]

A number of Australian Arabs experienced anti-Arab backlash during the First Gulf War. Newspapers received numerous letters calling for Arab Australians to "prove their loyalty" or "go home", and some Arab Australian Muslim women wearing hijab head coverings were reportedly harassed in public. The Australian government's Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission included accounts of racial harassment experienced by some Australian Arabs in their 1991 report on racism in Australia.[15]:11–13

On a few occasions in the 2000s and 2010s, tensions have flared between Australian Muslims and the general population. The Sydney gang rapes was a much reported set of incidents in 2000; a group of Lebanese men sexually assaulted non-Muslim women. In 2005, tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Cronulla area of Sydney led to violent rioting; the incident resulted in mass arrests and criminal prosecution. In 2012, Muslims protesting in central Sydney against Innocence of Muslims, an anti-Islam film trailer, resulted in rioting.[26] There was an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment in the aftermath of the Sydney hostage crisis on 15–16 December 2014, including a threat made against a mosque in Sydney.[27] However, the Muslim community also received support from the Australian public through a social media campaign.[28][29]

The founding president of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils has said that with moderate Muslims being sidelined by those promoting more fundamentalist views, there is a need to be more careful in regard to potential Australian immigrants. Keysar Trad has said moderate Muslims need to take back control.[30] An article in The Australian in May 2015 opined, "Most Muslims want the peace and prosperity that comes from an Islam that coexists with modernity; it is a fanatical fringe that seeks to impose a fabricated medieval Islam". It describes Dr Jamal Rifi as a brave insider who is working to assist "the cause of good Muslims who are struggling for the soul of Islam".[4]

Schools of jurisprudence in Australia



Most Australian Muslims are Sunni, with Shia then Sufi and Ahmadiyya as minorities.[5]

Sunni

Adherents of the Sunni denomination of Islam are concentrated in the suburb of Lakemba and surrounding areas such as Punchbowl, Wiley Park, Bankstown and Auburn.

In Australia there are also groups associated with the "hardline" Salafi branch of Islam, including the Islamic Information and Services Network of Australasia[31] and Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Association (Australia) (ASWJA).[32] While their numbers are small,[33] the ASWJA is said to "punch above its weight".[6]

Dawateislami is "a global non-political movement"[34] with adherents in Australia. (Refer Dawat-e-Islami and Sunni Dawat-e-Islami).


Religious life


The Australian Muslim community has built a number of mosques and Islamic schools, and a number of imams and clerics act as the community's spiritual and religious leaders. In 1988, the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) appointed Sheikh Taj El-Din Hilaly as the first Grand Mufti of Australia and New Zealand.[citation needed] In 2007, Hilaly was succeeded by Fehmi Naji in June 2007[55] who was succeeded by the current Grand Mufti, Ibrahim Abu Mohamed in September 2011.[56]

Fatwas, edicts based on Islamic jurisprudence which aim to provide "guidance to Muslim Australians in the personal, individual and private spheres of life",[57] are issued by various Australian Islamic authorities.[58][59]

Organisations

A number of organisations and associations are run by the Australian Islamic community including mosques, private schools and charities and other community groups and associations. Broad community associations which represent large segments of the Australian Muslim public are usually termed "Islamic councils". Some organisations are focused on providing assistance and support for specific sectors within the community, such as women.

Two organisations with strong political emphasis are Hizb ut-Tahrir[60] which describes itself as a, "political party whose ideology is Islam"[61][62] and Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah Association (ASWJA).[63][64]

A number of financial institutions have developed Sharia-compliant finance products,[65] with university courses leading to Islamic financial qualifications also being established.[66] Other Australian Islamic organisations have been set up to manage sharia-compliant investments, superannuation,[67] Islamic wills[68] and zakat management.[69][70]

Saudi Arabia has been heavily involved in funding Australian Islamic institutions, with estimates up to US$100 million.[71] This has generated tensions between some Australian Muslim organisations and has raised concerns within the wider Australian community.[72][73][74]

Conflict between religious groups in the Middle East are reflecting as tensions within the Australian community[75][76] and in the schools.[77]

Halal certification

A 1974 delegation from Saudi Arabia recommended that the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils should become the sole authority in Australia to certify that meat had been killed in accordance with Islamic rites.[78] There are now close to two dozen Halal certification authorities in Australia. Halal meat and meat product exports to the Middle East and Southeast Asia have greatly increased from the 1970s onwards; this expansion was due in part to efforts of the AFIC.[15]:151 Halal certification has been criticised by anti-Islam lobby groups who argue that the practice results in added costs, a requirement to officially certify intrinsically-halal foods and with consumers required to subsidise a particular religious belief.[79]

Issues

Concerns and contemporary issues facing the Australian Muslim community include rates of unemployment, the rights of women, concerns over Islamism and Islamic radicalism, among others.

Islamic preachers and clerics in Australia have been covered in the Australian press on account of the messages they have delivered publicly to the Muslim community or have otherwise shared with others in public settings. In some instances, various ideas and viewpoints espoused by these preachers have been subject of public or internal debate.[80] Statements viewed as misogynistic and radically paternalistic have come under criticism.[81]

Radical Islam

A number of incidents have highlighted the issues associated with radical Islam in Australia, including terrorism and militant activity.[82]

Several foreign terrorist organisations have sponsored the establishment of cells in Australia, including Lashkar-e-Taiba,[83][84] and Jemaah Islamiah.[85][86]:111[87]:38 Al-Shabaab is believed to have been behind the Holsworthy Barracks terror plot.[88][89][90][91] An man known as "Ahmed Y" established a small militant group in Australia in 2001 and advocated the idea of establishing an Islamic State in Australia.[92]:14 Groups led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika and Khaled Cheikho were active in Melbourne and Sydney, respectively, until police arrested their members in 2005.[93][94] Instances of domestic terror inspired by radical political Islam include the plots by Faheem Khalid Lodhi, Abdul Nacer Benbrika and Joseph T. Thomas.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), proscribed by the government as a terrorist organisation,[95] has targeted Australian Muslims for recruitment.[96] Making use of social media, recruiters target those vulnerable to radicalisation,[97][98] and encourage local jihad activities.[99][100] Some of those targeted have been minors, including a teenager who was arrested in Melbourne in May 2015 for plotting to detonate home-made bombs.[101] In June 2014, the government claimed that roughly 150 Australians had been recruited to fight in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.[102][103] A list released in April 2015 showed that most were young males who have come from a range of occupations, including students.[104] It was also reported at the time that 20 Australians had been killed fighting overseas for terror groups,[105] with 249 suspected jihadists prevented from leaving Australia.[106] The Border Force Counter-Terrorism Unit, tasked with stopping jihadists from leaving the country,[107] had cancelled more than 100 passports by the end of March 2015.[98] Several jihadists have expressed the desire to return to Australia,[108] but Prime Minister Tony Abbott has said that any who do would be prosecuted on their arrival.[109][110]

Responses

A number of forums and meetings have been held about the problem of extremist groups or ideology within the Australian Islamic community.[111] After the London bombings in 2005, Prime Minister John Howard established a Muslim Community Reference Group to assist governmental relations with the Muslim community.

Sydney's Muslim leaders, including Keysar Trad, have condemned the actions of suicide bombers and denounced ISIS.[112] The Shia community in Australia have also expressed their concern regarding ISIS.[37][113] In February 2015, Ameer Ali former president of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils called on religious leaders to oppose Islamic State as, "I haven't heard so far any single imam in this country that has named IS and condemned it."[114]

Glenn Mohammed a Muslim lawyer has written, "Muslims need to be able to discuss these issues openly and denounce barbaric behaviour. Instead, we choose to remain silent and then criticise a government that tries to make Australia safer."[115] Psychiatrist Tanveer Ahmed has examined underlying causes and has identified the significance of issues relating to 'family' and to 'denial'. He has said, "Muslim youths have unique difficulties in coming to terms with their identity, especially when they have conflicting value systems at home compared with school or work".[116]

Peter Jennings, Executive Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has said Australian Muslim leaders need to recognise that there are a "disturbing number of radicalised ideologues" who do not believe Islam is peaceful. He says, "some dramatic self-healing is needed".[117]

In May 2015, the Abbott Government committed a further AU$450 million to fight home-grown terrorism.[118]

Discrimination

According to some scholars, a particular trend of anti-Muslim prejudice has developed in Australia since the late 1980s.[119] Since the 2001 World Trade Center attacks in New York, and the 2005 Bali bombings, Islam and its place in Australian society has been the subject of much public debate.[120]

A report published in 2004 by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission pointed to many Muslim Australians who felt the Australian media was unfairly critical of, and often vilified their community due to generalisations of terrorism and the emphasis on crime. The use of ethnic or religious labels in news reports about crime was thought to stir up racial tensions.[121]

Muslims in Australia have historically been disadvantaged socially and economically, to some extent, owing to their status as a non-White, minority group. After the White Australia immigration laws were replaced with multicultural policies the social disadvantage of Muslims was thought to have been alleviated. Some sources, however, note that Muslims now face some disadvantages on account of their religion.[15]:15–16 At times there has been opposition to the construction of new mosques in Australia. A 2014 report from the Islamic Sciences and Research Academy, University of Western Sydney, on mosques in New South Wales found that 44 percent of mosques in the state had "experienced resistance from the local community when the mosque was initially proposed". In around 20 percent of these cases opposition was from a small number of people.[122]

According to Michael Humphrey, a professor of sociology at the University of Sydney, much of Islamic culture and organisation in Australia has been borne of the social marginalisation experiences of Muslim working class migrants. This "immigrant Islam" is often viewed by the host society as a force of "cultural resistance" toward the multicultural and secular nature of the general Australian culture. Muslim practices of praying, fasting and veiling appear as challenging the conformity within public spaces and the values of gender equality in social relationships and individual rights. The immigrant Muslims are often required to "negotiate their Muslimness" in the course of their encounters with Australian society, the governmental and other social institutions and bureaucracies.[123]

Women's rights

As part of the broader issue of women's rights and Islam, the perceived gender inequality in Islam has often been the focal point of criticism in Australia through comparisons to the situation of women in Islamic nations. Muslim women can face hurdles both from within the Muslim community and from the wider community.[120][124] Following a successful appeal to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal by a Muslim lady, who believes it is a sin to be seen without a niqab, the policy of the Monash hospital is now for female doctors to attend to female patients, if requested.[125] Several Melbourne councils have women-only sessions in their swimming pools. Monash Council has provided a curtain to ensure privacy for Muslim women

It has been reported that female circumcision has been carried out in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia, with a Sydney sheikh arrested in relation to alleged genital mutilation.[128][129] There are reportedly 120,000 migrant women living in Australia who have had their genitals mutilated.[130] A Sydney imam has said, "Female circumcision in its legitimate form is a personal and human right of a woman [while] genital mutilation is a horrible crime."[131]

There has been prosecutions under Australian law in regards to Islamic marriages involving underage girls.[132][133][134] It has been reported that a "growing number of Muslim men [have] multiple wives"; the same story cited Islamic Friendship Association of Australia president Keysar Trad as believing that there were "not many more than 50" polygamist Muslim families in Australia.[135] The AFIC has advocated Australian Muslims being able to marry and divorce under the principles of Sharia law, saying that Australian Muslims should enjoy "legal pluralism".[136][137]

Employment, education and crime

As of 2007, average wages of Muslims were much lower than those of the national average, with just 5% of Muslims earning over $1000 per week compared to the average of 11%. Unemployment rates amongst Muslims born overseas were higher than Muslims born in Australia.[120]

Muslims are over-represented in jails in New South Wales, at 9% to 10% of the prison population, compared to less than 3% within the NSW population.[138]

Other issues

There is antisemitism among Muslims in Australia. The leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir has said that the Jews "are evil creatures",[139] and the principal of Al-Taqwa College told students that ISIL is a scheme created by Israel.[140] An Islamic bookstore in Lakemba was found to be selling a children's book that describes Jews as "much conceited" and intent on world domination.[77]

Material sold at some Islamic bookshops have raised concerns. For example, the Islamic Information Bookshop in Melbourne was stocking literature "calling for violence against non-Muslims";[141] the Al Risalah Bookshop[142] was said to be "encouraging young Australians to fight in Syria";[143][144] and the Al-Furqan Bookshop[145][146] was said to be polarising members with extreme views.[147] In Brisbane, the iQraa Bookstore was said to promote extremism.[148][149] It was reported in 2015 that the al-Furqan and al-Risalah bookshops had both closed, but concern has been raised that this might be the "worst thing that could happen" as they provided a place for people to go to "express their frustrations".[150]

Demography

Trends

During the 1980s the Australian Muslim population increased from 76,792 or 0.53% of the Australian population in 1981, to 109,523 or 0.70% in 1986.[citation needed] In the 2011 Census, the Muslim population was 479,300 or 2.25%, an increase of 438% on the 1981 number.

The general increase of the Muslim population in this decade was from 147,487 or 0.88% of the Australian population in 1991, to 200,885 or 1.12% in 1996.[citation needed]

In 2005 the overall Muslim population in Australia had grown from 281,600 or 1.50% of the general Australian population in 2001, to 340,400 or 1.71% in 2006. The growth of Muslim population at this time was recorded as 3.88% compared to 1.13% for the general Australian population.[citation needed]

The following is a breakdown of the country of birth of Muslims in Australia from 2001:[151]

There were 281,578 Muslims recorded in this survey; in the 2006 census the population had grown to 340,392.[152] 48% of Australian-born Muslims claimed Lebanese or Turkish ancestry.[151]

The distribution by state of the nation's Islamic followers has New South Wales with 50% of the total number of Muslims, followed by Victoria (33%), Western Australia (7%), Queensland (5%), South Australia (3%), ACT (1%) and both Northern Territory and Tasmania sharing 0.3%.[citation needed]

The majority of people who reported Islam as their religion in the 2006 Census were born overseas: 58% (198,400).[152] Of all persons affiliating with Islam in 2006 almost 9% were born in Lebanon and 7% were born in Turkey.[153]

Areas

Many Muslims living in Melbourne are Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) and Turkish Muslims. Melbourne's Australian Muslims live primarily in the northern suburbs surrounding Broadmeadows (mostly Turkish) and a few in the outer southern suburbs such as Noble Park and Dandenong (mainly Bosniaks).

Very few Muslims live in regional areas with the exceptions of the sizeable Turkish and Albanian community in Shepparton, Victoria and Malays in Katanning, Western Australia. A community of Iraqis have settled in Cobram on the Murray River in Victoria.[154]

Perth also has a Muslim community focussed in and around the suburb of Thornlie, where there is a Mosque. Perth's Australian Islamic School has around 2,000 students on three campuses.

Mirrabooka and neighbouring Girrawheen contain predominantly Bosniak communities. The oldest mosque in Perth is the Perth Mosque on William Street in Northbridge. It has undergone many renovations although the original section still remains. Other mosques in Perth are located in Rivervale, Mirrabooka, Beechboro and Hepburn.

There are also communities of Muslims from Turkey, the Indian subcontinent (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh) and South-East Asia, in Sydney and Melbourne, the Turkish communities around Auburn, New South Wales and Meadow Heights and Roxburgh Park and the South Asian communities around Parramatta. Indonesian Muslims, are more widely distributed in Darwin.

Communities

Aboriginal Muslims

According to Australia's 2011 census, 1,140 people identify as Aboriginal Muslims, almost double the number of Aboriginal Muslims recorded in the 2001 census.[155] Many are converts and some are descendants of Afghan cameleers or, as in the Arnhem Land people, have Macassan ancestry as a result of the historical Makassan contact with Australia.[156][157] In north east Arnhem Land, there is some Islamic influence on the songs, paintings, dances, prayers with certains hymns to "Allah" and funeral rituals like facing west during prayers, roughly the direction of Mecca, and ritual prostration reminiscent of the Muslim sujud.[155] As a result of Malay indentured laborers, plenty of families in Northern Australia have names like Doolah, Hassan and Khan.[155] The boxer Anthony Mundine is a member of this community.[158] Many indigenous converts are attracted to Islam because they see a compatibility between Aboriginal and Islamic beliefs,[159] while others see it as a fresh start and an aid against common social ills afflicting indigenous Australians, such as alcohol and drug abuse.[155]

Bangladeshi Muslims


Bangladeshi Muslims are located primarily in Western Sydney with a mosque at Seaton[160] and in the south-east of Melbourne, with a mosque at Huntingdale.[161] The Seaton Mosque has been linked to the Tablighi Jamaat School of Islam[162] and has hosted Hizb ut-Tahrir.[163] For Bangladeshi Muslims attending the Huntingdale Mosque, all Islamic lunar months, such as Ramadan are observed using local moon-sightings, rather than being based on Middle-Eastern, or other, timings.[164][165]

Bosnian Muslims

Bosnian Muslims have predominantly arrived in Australia after 1992, with most of the community living in the south east of Melbourne and in the south west of Sydney. There are Bosnian Muslim mosques in Deer Park and Penshurst.[166]

Lebanese Muslims

Lebanese Muslims form the core of Australia's Muslim Arab population, particularly in Sydney where most Arabs in Australia live. Approximately 3.4% of Sydney's population are Muslim.

Somali Muslims

Although the first Somali community in Victoria was established in 1988, most Somalis began to settle in the country in the early 1990s following the civil war in Somalia.[167] Somalis are active in the wider Australian Muslim community, and have also contributed significantly to local business.[168]

Turkish Muslims

Turkish Muslims are a significant segment of the Australian Muslim community. Some statistical reports forecast the Turkish Muslim population in Australia surpassing the Lebanese Muslim population in the 2020s and 2030s. The majority of Turkish Muslims in Sydney are from Auburn, Eastlakes and Prestons. Despite still having a large Turkish population in Auburn and Eastlakes, many Turks moved out of these areas and moved to Prestons to be close to the new and growing Turkish private school, Amity College which is run by people closely affiliated with the Galaxy Foundation (formerly Feza Foundation).

In literature and film


There are a number of notable works in Australian literature that discuss the Muslims during the "Afghan period" (1860-1900).[15]:

  • The Camel in Australia, by Tom L. McKnight
  • Fear and Hatred, by Andrew Markus
  • Afghans in Australia, by Michael Cigler
  • Tin Mosques and Ghantowns, by Christine Stevens
  • Ali Abdul v The King, by Hanifa Deen
  • Australia's Muslim Cameleers: Pioneers of the inland, 1860s–1930s, by Dr Anna Kenny

Veiled Ambition is a documentary created by Rebel Films for the SBS independent network following a Lebanese-Australian woman named Frida as she opens a shop selling fashionable clothing for Muslim women on Melbourne's Sydney Road. The documentary follows Frida as she develops her business in Melbourne while juggling a husband and home in Sydney and a pregnancy.[169] Veiled Ambition won the Palace Films Award for Short Film Promoting Human Rights at the 2006 Melbourne International Film Festival.[170]

Sunday, October 11, 2015

Forgotten Hero of Islam: Alp Arslan

Seljuk Empire


Many years before Salāh al-Dīn’s magnanimity towards the defeated barbaric crusaders, another Muslim leader had shown the world how a Muslim ruler behaves with mercy and restraint in this very month of August.

Soon after the advent of Islām, the Roman Empire faced an energetic new challenger in the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyads made two serious attempts to conquer the Roman Empire, laying siege to Constantinople in 674-8 CE and again in 717 CE. Fortunately for Byzantium, the Umayyad Caliphate was overthrown in 750 CE by the Abbasids, who gave up such ambitious plans, opting instead for regular military campaigns that sometimes penetrated right into the heart of Byzantine Anatolia. These raids culminated in Caliph Mu’tasim’s (833-842 CE) destruction of Amorium in central western Anatolia in 838 CE.[2]

By the end of the eighth century however, Byzantium’s situation began to improve whereas the Abbasid economy was in decline and the government was paralysed by religious and political factionalism – this was the height of heresy with philosophers, mu’tazilites and bātinites. The Byzantines exploited Abbasid disunity to take the offensive and over the course of two centuries recovered their lost provinces of Illyricum, Greece, Bulgaria, Northern Syria, Cilicia, and Armenia. At this same time that the Byzantines were celebrating their revival, a new player in international affairs arrived on the scene – the Seljuk Turks who were a family of nomadic Oghuz Turks who had converted to Islām around the end of the tenth century.

The Seljuk Turks


The Abbasid Caliphate was in disarray and there was no effective force to stop the migration of Central Asian nomads. In 1040 CE, the first Seljuk horsemen under their first major leader, Tughril Beg penetrated the Caliphate’s eastern border and, without encountering any effective Abbasid opposition, began plundering their way across Iran and Iraq. They soon crossed into Armenia and drove deep into Anatolia, reaching the Byzantine port city of Trebizond on the Black Sea coast in 1054 CE. The following year, the Abbasids bowed to the inevitable and conceded political and military authority to Tughrul Beg of the Seljuks. Tughrul Beg (1056-1067 CE) was granted the title of Sultan and took Baghdad as his capital. Suddenly the Seljuks were elevated from nomadic raiders to masters of a vast and sophisticated empire.

The rise of the Seljuks caused disunity amongst the Byzantines. In 1064 CE the Seljuk’s captured and sacked Ani. Ani was critical to the Byzantine’s eastern defence strategy.
Constantine X died in 1067 CE leaving the administration in the hands of his wife Eudocia who married Romanus who then became the Emperor of Byzantine Rome.

Alp Arslan and events leading to the Battle


In 1063 CE (454 AH), Tughril’s nephew, Alp Arslan became Sultan of Persia and Iraq. His actual name was Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd and came to be known as Alp Arslan which means ‘heroic lion’ or ‘courageous lion’. His vizier (Chief Administrator), Nizam al-Mulk (Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ali Tusi), who was also a scholar came to be known as one of the greatest viziers and would go on to establish the esteemed Nizamiyah Madrasa – Imām Ghazzāli was to be one of its rectors.
Sultan Alp Arslan was a merciful and generous leader, even against his enemies which proved to be a key feature during his rule. In the year 1066 (459AH), the ruler in the area of Kirman called Qara Arslan, rebelled against Alp Arslan. After marching towards Kirman and one of his detachment forces being defeated by Alp Arslan, Qara sought forgiveness from Alp, who received him graciously. The Sultan restored him to his kingdom and changed nothing in his position [3].

In 1069 CE (462 AH), the envoy of the ruler of Makkah, Muhammad ibn Abu Hashim visited Sultan Alp Arslan to inform him of the introduction of the khutbah (sermon) at Makkah in the name of the Caliph, al-Qa’im bi-Amr Allah and the Sultan and the dropping of the khutbah for the Fatimid ruler of Egypt and that they had abandoned the call to prayer with the Fatimid formula of “Hayya a’la khayril ‘amal” (‘Hasten towards the best of action’). The Sultan gave him 30,000 dinars and robes of honour and arranged an annual pension [3].

Sultan Alp Arslan regarded the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt as his main enemy; he had no desire to engage the neighbouring Byzantines in unnecessary hostilities and as such, in the same year of 1069, he entered into a treaty where he had committed to preventing Seljuk raiding on Byzantine territory
In 1071 CE (436AH), Sultan Alp Arslan made his way to Edessa in Syria where it was reported to him that although the khutbah there went out in the name of the Caliph, they continued to pronounce the adhan of the Fatimid and as such, Sultan Alp Arslan marched towards them. The leader there, Mahmud ibn Salih sought Sultan Alp Arslan’s forgiveness with his mother in attendance. Sultan Alp Arslan received them both with kindness, gave robes of honour to Mahmud and restored him to his town.[3]

In the meantime, Romanus needed a decisive victory not only to protect Armenia but also his throne and, in the summer of 1071 CE, Romanus decided to gamble everything on a massive eastern campaign that would draw the Seljuk’s into a engagement with Byzantine. In February 1071 CE, Romanus sent an embassy to Alp Arslan to renew the treaty of 1069 CE. Romanus’ envoys reached the Sultan outside Edessa, which he was besieging at the time. Keen to secure his northern flank against Byzantine attack, Alp Arslan happily agreed to the TERMS, abandoned the siege and immediately led his army south to attack Aleppo in Fatimid Syria. Aleppo was subdued and introduced the khutbahs in the name of Caliph al-Qā’im bi-amr Allāh and Sultan Alp Arslan. It has been recorded that the commoners in the city took away the rugs in the Mosque saying “These are Ali ibn Abi Tālib’s rugs, let Abū Bakr bring rugs for his followers to pray on”.
The offer to renew the peace treaty by Romanus was a key element of Romanus’ plan, distracting the Sultan long enough to allow Romanus to lead an army into Armenia and recover the lost fortresses before the Seljuks had time to respond. Romanus’ offer to renew the treaty while at the same time preparing for a war was deceitful, but the use of deceit in warfare was a skill the Byzantines prized very highly. Byzantine tactical manuals regularly recommended using ploys, deceit and negotiation and to either avoid battle or gain advantage.[4]

The Battle of Manzikert


Romanus marched with 200,000 men, Greeks, Franks, Russians, Georgians, Armenians and many others. Many historians such as Matthew of Edessa claim the Byzantine army exceeded one million men [5] – Gibbons claims it was the largest army ever fielded by the Roman Empire, East or West. They came with much equipment and in great pomp and to attack the lands of Islām arriving in Malazgrid, also known as Manzikert.

News reached Sultan Alp Arslan when he was laying siege in Azerbaijan. Sultan Alp Arslan knew that he would not be able to raise his army who were far away and whilst the enemy was close. He gathered the men he had with him which numbered around 15,000. They then marched on and when they drew near the enemy, they encountered an advance guard of the Byzantines of around 10,000. After a brief engagement, the advance guard fled. When Sultan Alp Arslan drew nearer, he sent a message to Emperor Romanus for a truce but this was emphatically refused by Romanus.
It is said that before battle, Romanus sent an envoy to Sultan Alp Arslan as one last warning saying: “I have come to you with forces you cannot resist so become subservient to me willingly”. This angered Sultan Alp Arslan and the glory of Islām filled his breast and he responded:
“Tell your master it is not you who have brought me out but it is God, to Whom be praise, who has brought you and your troops to me to make you food for the Muslims” [6]
Sultan Alp Arslan was then advised by the Imām and Scholar of the army, Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Abdul Malik as follows:

“You are fighting for a religion which Allāh promised to support and to make it prevail over all others. I trust that Allāh will have PUT this victory down to your name. Confront them on Friday in the afternoon, at the hour when the preachers will be in the pulpits. They will be praying for victory for the warriors of jihād – and prayer is linked to a favourable response.”[3]
        
Accordingly, just as the hour came on Friday 20 Dhu’l-Qa’da 463 AH, corresponding to 19 August 1071 CE, Sultan Alp Arslan led all his men in prayer following which he wept much beseeching Allāh and they too wept with him. He then addressed his men and said:

“We are with a depleted force. Either I will achieve the goal or I will go as a martyr to Paradise. If I die, then know that my son, Malikshah is to be my heir. Whosoever wishes to depart, let him depart, for there is no Sultan to command and forbid today for I too am a ghazi (warrior) with you.”[7]
Encouraged by the fact that no one departed; he threw down his bow and arrows, picked up his sword and mace and tied the tail of his horse. He PUT on a white coloured clothing, anointed his body and said “If I am killed, then this is my winding sheet”. He then moved closer to the enemy and then dismounted his horse, rubbed his face in the dust of the plains of battle and wept and prayed to Allāh for a considerable amount of time for he understood the words of the Messenger of Allāh (sall Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) who was reported to have said:

“Two du’ās are never rejected, or rarely rejected: the du’a during the call for prayer, and the du’a during the calamity when the two armies attack each other”[8]

The Byzantines set up like the number five on a dice with Romanus in the Centre whilst the army of Islām set up in a crescent formation hiding their small number. Voices reciting the Qur‘ān and the sounds of drums from the Sultan’s troops, and the ringing of bells from the Byzantines, filled the air. Sultan Alp Arslan then mounted his horse and charged towards the enemy lines with cries of “Allāhu Akbar” in unison with his army such that the mountains trembled. The charge was so ferocious that the dust which emerged from beneath provided them with much cover as they smashed into the centre of the Byzantine army. Allāh’s help descended and many of the enemy’s army were sent to their hereafter whilst the others fled in retreat with the soldiers of the Sultan reciting the verse I have set out at the outset of this article.[9] But it was to get better. The Muslims had MANAGED to capture the Emperor of the Byzantines, Romanus himself.

When Romanus was taken to Sultan Alp Arslan, the Sultan beat him three times with his whip and the following conversation is said to have then taken place:

Alp Arslan:     “What would you do if I was brought before you as a prisoner?”
Romanus:     “Perhaps I’d kill you, or exhibit you in the streets of Constantinople.”
Alp Arslan:     “My punishment is far heavier. I forgive you, and set you free”.[10]
Arslan negotiated a peace with Romanus before permitting him to depart. This saw the transfer of Antioch, Edessa, Hierapolis, and Manzikert to the Seljuks as well as the initial PAYMENT of 1.5 million GOLD pieces and 360,000 gold pieces annually as ransom for Romanus. Romanus remained captive with Sultan Alp Arslan for approximately a week during which time he treated him with great kindness and generosity. He escorted him a long distance back to Constantinople and sent with him a number of his men for safe passage with a banner above his head bearing the words ‘There is nothing worthy of worship but Allāh’ [7].

For Romanus, when he returned he found that he had been dethroned, was blinded and sent into exile by another powerful dynasty, the house of Ducas. As for Sultan Alp Arslan, just under a year after the momentous battle, the Sultan set out for Mawarannahr (Transoxiana) and subdued its tyrant ruler, Yusuf al-Khwarezmi. Yusuf was being tied up and insulted the Sultan who asked for him to be released and took aim at him with his trusted bow except, for the first time, he missed his target and Yusuf, who had two knives hidden in his garment, stabbed the Sultan before he himself was killed.[3] The wound which the Sultan received eventually led to his death and with that, came the end of one of the most courageous sons of Islām.

Points to Note:


There are many points we can take from the life and times of Sultan Alp Arslan but to list all of them would mean that this article would become endless.

Firstly, in a time when Muslims are negatively portrayed as barbaric because of the wrongful acts of a few in how they treat their prisoners, here we see a leader who dealt with his foes mercifully. Imagine, the head of the enemy who was the aggressor in attacking you, who killed many of your people and caused many injuries and much devastation and now you have him in your grasp – to pardon him indeed takes great character. This example in dealing with your enemies is one that you will not find anywhere outside the house of Islām where you will also find many other examples such as how the Messenger of Allāh (sall Allāhu ʿalayhi wa sallam) dealt with the Quraish at the Conquest of Makkah and how Salāh al-Dīn would deal with the barbaric crusaders almost a century after Sultan Alp Arslan.

Regarding the crusaders, it should not be forgotten that this battle was so devastating, that it set in motion a number of events – one of these was that, within a decade, Pope Urban would make a call to unite Western and Eastern Christendom to avenge the consequences of the defeat at Manzikert in what was the first Crusades. Another event that was set in motion was that the victory opened up the area of Anatolia to the Muslims which marked the beginning of the end of the Byzantine Empire’s tenure as a dominant world power, and marked not only the beginning of the end of their civilization, but also sparked the birth and rise of a powerful Muslim presence that would last until its dissolution almost nine hundred years later, the Ottoman Empire, and thus, the battle of Manzikert is one of the most defining battles in history.

We learn that the outward display of pomp and splendour of Romanus and the Byzantines were of no avail to them and that victory is indeed in the hands of Allāh.
We also see the power of Friday, the day of Jumuʿah in the conscious of the Muslims and how they linked the power of duʿā with victory and how certain they were in their knowledge that on this day, the Muslims everywhere would raise their hands in duʿā for those fighting for them whereas today, you will find many Imāms and Muslims afraid to do so openly for fear of being criminalised.
So, now you know who Sultan Alp Arslan is, I hope you will make him a household name and ensure that his noble legacy lives on. May Allāh make his grave spacious and may Allāh have mercy on him as he had mercy on those he ruled. May Allāh send to this ummah men like him.

Source: www.islam21c.com

Notes:

[1] Al-Qur’ān 2:249
[2] Gibbons: Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire
[3] Ibn Athir: A Complete History
[4] Dennis, George: Maurice’s Strategikon: Handbook of Byzantine military strategy
[5] Lord John Julius Norwich: Byzantium – The Apogee
[6] Al-Husayni: Akhbar al-Dawla al-Saljuqiyya
[7] Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Muntazam;
[9] Abu Dawud
[9] Nishapuri, Saljuqnama
[10] Peoples, R. Scott: Crusade of Kings

*Paul Markham: The Battle of Manzikert: Military Disaster or Political Failure?
*Carole Hillenbrand: Turkish Myth & Muslim Symbol

ISIS Makes Gains in Syria Territory Bombed by Russia

Syria Civil War Statistic


BEIRUT, Lebanon — The Islamic State registered significant gains on Friday in the area of northwestern Syria that Russian warplanes have been bombing, taking six villages near Aleppo and threatening to cut off an important route north to the Turkish border. Late in the day, there were reports that rebels had reasserted control in one village.

The Kremlin has said its military had entered Syria to fight the Islamic State, but the Russian forces have concentrated much of their firepower on insurgent groups aligned against President Bashar al-Assad, including the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, and relatively secular groups like the Free Syrian Army. Rival insurgents say that the Islamic State, also called ISIS or Daesh, is taking advantage.

“Daesh has exploited the Russian airstrikes and the preoccupation of the Free Syrian Army in its battles in Hama, and advanced in Aleppo,” one rebel commander told Reuters.

The Islamic State advance is threatening a strategic area north of Aleppo on the way to crossing points into Turkey that was to be part of a proposed ISIS-free buffer zone under a plan the United States announced over the summer with Turkey. That plan now seems to have stalled.

A prominent Iranian general was killed in Syria on Thursday night, Iranian officials and state news media reported Friday, illustrating the level of Iran’s direct involvement on the government side in the Syrian civil war.

The general, Hussein Hamedani, a senior figure in the Revolutionary Guards, was killed in Aleppo Province, where he was advising the Syrian military, the reports said. The Iranian state news outlet Press TV, citing a statement by the Revolutionary Guards, reported that the general had been killed by Islamic State fighters, but did not say how.

General Hamedani was a top commander during the Iran-Iraq war and led the crackdown against antigovernment protests that erupted after the disputed election of 2009.

Iran has been providing an economic lifeline and intensive military assistance to the Assad government, whose forces have been locked in a protracted civil war in which more than 250,000 people have died and millions more have been driven from their homes or fled the country.

Iranian advisers have helped train tens of thousands of fighters in a new pro-government militia called the National Defense Forces; provided strategic, tactical and political advice; and taken important roles in key negotiations, including a deal last year to evacuate rebels from the besieged Old City section of Homs. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite militia closely allied with Iran, has also fought pivotal battles on the side of the government.

Another Revolutionary Guards officer, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Ali Allahdadi, was killed in Syria in January.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a British-based monitoring group with extensive contacts in Syria, said General Hamedani was killed Thursday near the Kweiris military airport east of Aleppo. Aircraft based there are often used to bomb Al Bab, a city held by Islamic State militants.

The battle lines in and around Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, are complicated, with control contested among government forces and rival insurgent groups. On the city’s outskirts, Islamic State fighters are battling the government, and others where they are fighting other rebel groups.

Despite airstrikes against the Islamic State by the American-led coalition and the Russians, its fighters have been gaining ground from rival insurgents northeast of Aleppo. They advanced Friday in a blaze of car bombs, antigovernment activists said.

One of the bombs killed Saleh Mahmoud Leyla, a Syrian journalist working for Turkey’s state-run news agency, Anadolu, according to the agency. Mr. Leyla, who had also been an antigovernment activist, frequently covered news developments in insurgent-held areas of Syria. Dozens of Syrian journalists have lost their lives in the conflict.

Jalal Zein al-Din, the pen name of a Syrian journalist working in an ISIS-held area of Aleppo Province, said the advance was aided by the United States’ insistence on removing the Nusra Front from the area and leaving only groups the West was willing to deal with. He said the Free Syrian Army could not hold off the Islamic State by itself.

Some antigovernment activists have accused Mr. Assad’s ally, Russia, of strengthening the Islamic State by mounting airstrikes in recent days against an anti-ISIS rebel group called Suqour al-Jabal, or Falcons of the Mountain. Mr. Assad and the Russians call all of the government’s opponents terrorists.

As the Russians continue their airstrikes, the Pentagon is seeking to establish guidelines so that Russian and American pilots can avoid each other in the skies over Syria. The Pentagon has received a formal response to its safety proposals from Russia’s Defense Ministry, Peter Cook, the Pentagon’s press secretary, said Friday. Talks are likely to continue over the weekend, officials said.


If the drive by the Islamic State succeeds, said Sajid, an antigovernment activist in the area of the fighting, “the revolution will be extinguished in northern Aleppo Province.”

Sajid, who would not give his full name, for security reasons, said that the day before, American warplanes had flown “over our areas without bombing.”

“This is ridiculous!” he said. “Four coalition planes, flying but doing nothing, and Daesh was advancing. They are making fun of us.”

Correction: October 9, 2015
Because of an editing error, an earlier version of this article referred incorrectly to claims of responsibility by the Islamic State. They were for car-bomb attacks on rival insurgents near Aleppo, not for the death of Gen. Hussein Hamedani.

Anne Barnard reported from Beirut, and Thomas Erdbrink from Tehran. Reporting was contributed by Dan Bilefsky and Helene Cooper from London, and Hwaida Saad and Maher Samaan from Beirut.

Source : The New York Times

Islam in England

Jamea Masjid
Jamea Masjid in Preston, known for its architectural design.

Islam in England is the largest non-Christian religion, with most Muslims being immigrants from South Asia (in particular Bangladesh, Pakistan and India) or descendants of immigrants from that region. Many others are from Muslim-dominated regions such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Somalia, while fewer come from sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Uganda and Sierra Leone.[1]

According to the 2011 Census, 2.7 million Muslims live in England and Wales where they form 5.0% of the general population[2] and 9.1% of children under the age of five.

History


Middle Ages

Although Islam is generally thought of as being a recent arrival in England, there has been minor contact between the English and Muslims for many centuries.

An early example would be the decision of Offa, the 8th-century King of Mercia (one of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms existing at that time), to have a coin minted with an Islamic inscription - largely a copy of coins issued by the contemporary Muslim ruler, Caliph Al-Mansur. These coins may have been minted simply for prestige or to facilitate trade with the expanding Caliphate of Córdoba, as Islamic gold dinars were the most important coinage in the Mediterranean at the time. Offa's coin looked enough like the original that it would be readily accepted in southern Europe, while at the same time his own name was clearly visible.[4]

References to Britain are also found in early Islamic geographical literature, such as the 9th century work of Ahmad ibn Rustah (died 910) which describes the islands of "Bratiniya".[5]

Muslim scholarship, especially early Islamic philosophy and Islamic science, was well-known through Latin translation among the learned in England by 1386, when Geoffrey Chaucer was writing. In the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, there is among the pilgrims wending their way to Canterbury, a 'Doctour of Phisyk' whose learning included Rhazes (Al-Razi), Avicenna (Ibn Sina, Arabic ابن سينا) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd, Arabic ابن رشد). In the Pardoner's Tale, Chaucer mentions part Avicenna's work concerning poisons.[6] Avicenna's The Canon of Medicine (1025), in Latin translation, was a standard text for medical students up until the 18th century.[7] Roger Bacon, one of the earliest European advocates of the scientific method,[8] is known to have studied the works of several early Muslim philosophers.[9][10] In particular, his work on optics in the 13th century was influenced by the Book of Optics (1021) by Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen).[11]

Professor John Makdisi's "The Islamic Origins of the Common Law" in the North Carolina Law Review,[12] curiously suggested that English common law was inspired by medieval Islamic law.[13] Makdisi drew comparisons between the "royal English contract protected by the action of debt" and the "Islamic Aqd", the "English assize of novel disseisin" (a petty assize adopted in the 1166 at the Assizes of Clarendon) and the "Islamic Istihqaq", and the "English jury" and the "Islamic Lafif" in the classical Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, and argued that these institutions were transmitted to England by the Normans,[12] "through the close connection between the Norman kingdoms of Roger II in Sicily — ruling over a conquered Islamic administration — and Henry II in England."[14] Makdisi also argued that the "law schools known as Inns of Court" in England (which he asserts are parallel to Madrasahs) may have also originated from Islamic law,[12] although they bear more similarity to the much closer-to-home Oxbridge Colleges (at which most students would have previously studied) and arose in concentration in Holborn after the clergy were forbidden to teach common law by the Pope, and law schools were banished from the City of London (their current location being between the old City and the courts at Westminster).[citation needed] He states that the methodology of legal precedent and reasoning by analogy (Qiyas) are also similar in both the Islamic and common law systems,[15] although the English practice arises from the methodology of Bracton, resulting in the subsequent publication of law reports.[citation needed] Other legal scholars such as Monica Gaudiosi, Gamal Moursi Badr and A. Hudson have argued that the English trust and agency institutions, which were introduced by Crusaders, may have been adapted from the Islamic Waqf and Hawala institutions they came across in the Middle East.[16][17][18] Paul Brand also notes parallels between the Waqf and the trusts used to establish Merton College by Walter de Merton, who had connections with the Knights Templar, but Brand also points out that the Knights Templar were primarily concerned with fighting the Muslims rather than learning from them, making it less likely that they would imitate Muslim legal institutions.[13] Moreover, the "waqf" concept refers to a charitable designation of property whereas the introduction of trust law was a reaction to the failure of persons to whom crusaders conveyed their lands whilst on crusade to return the lands when the crusaders returned (as opposed to the charitable trust which would be used to found an academic institution and has its origin in Roman law).[citation needed] The conventional accepted view is that English law is a continuation of Anglo-Saxon law centuries earlier.[citation needed]


Early modern period

The first English convert to Islam mentioned by name is John Nelson.[19] The 16th-century writer Richard Hakluyt claimed he was forced to convert, though he mentions in the same story other Englishmen who had converted willingly.


This king had a son which was a ruler in an island called Gerbi, whereunto arrived an English ship called the Green Dragon, of the which was master one M. Blonket, who, having a very unhappy boy on that ship, and understanding that whosoever would turn Turk should be well entertained of the a yeoman of our Queen's guard, whom the king's son had enforced to turn Turk; his name was John Nelson.[20]

Captain John Ward of Kent was one of a number of British sailors who became pirates based in the Maghreb who also converted to Islam (see also Barbary pirates). Captain John Ward was obsessed with little birds during his time in Tunisia (where he fled). So much that the locals would call him "Jack Asfur" being Arabic for sparrow. This is where the name "Captain Jack Sparrow" comes from.

Unitarians became interested in the faith, and Henry Stubbes wrote so favourably about Islam that it is thought he too had converted to the faith.

From 1609 to 1616, England lost 466 ships to Barbary pirates, who sold the passengers into slavery in North Africa.[21] In 1625, it was reported that Lundy, an island in the Bristol Channel which had been a pirate lair for much of the previous half century, had been occupied by three Ottoman pirates who were threatening to burn Ilfracombe; Algerine rovers were using the island as a base in 1635, although the island had itself been attacked and plundered by a Spanish raid in 1633.[22] In 1627, Barbary pirates under command of the Dutch renegade Jan Janszoon operating from the Moroccan port of Salé occupied Lundy, before they were expelled by Sir John Pennington.[22][23] During this time there were reports of captured slaves being sent to Algiers and of the Islamic flag flying over Lundy.[24][25]

The Muslim Moors had a noticeable influence on the works of George Peele and William Shakespeare. Some of their works featured Moorish characters, such as Peele's The Battle of Alcazar and Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice, Titus Andronicus and Othello, which featured a Moorish Othello as its title character. These works are said to have been inspired by several Moorish delegations from Morocco to Elizabethan England around 1600.[26] A portrait was painted of one of the Moorish ambassadors, Abd el-Ouahed ben Messaoud ben Mohammed Anoun, who had come to promote an Anglo-Moroccan alliance.

Turbans were worn in Renaissance England. While friendly relations were formed between England and the Islamic civilizations of the Middle East in the early 16th century, Persian and Turkish style fashions were sometimes worn by the higher classes as a form of party or fancy dress.

Diplomatic relations were also established with the Ottoman Empire with the chartering of the Levant Company and the dispatch of the first English ambassador to the Porte, William Harborne, in 1578.[27] For the first time, a Treaty of Commerce was signed in 1580.[28] Numerous envoys were dispatched in both directions and epistolar exchanges occurred between Elizabeth and Sultan Murad III.[27] In one correspondence, Murad entertained the notion that Islam and Protestantism had "much more in common than either did with Roman Catholicism, as both rejected the worship of idols", and argued for an alliance between England and the Ottoman Empire.[29] To the dismay of Catholic Europe, England exported tin and lead (for cannon-casting) and ammunitions to the Ottoman Empire, and Elizabeth seriously discussed joint military operations with Murad III during the outbreak of war with Spain in 1585, as Francis Walsingham was lobbying for a direct Ottoman military involvement against the common Spanish enemy.[30][31] Although she never did receive any assistance from the Ottomans, her relations with the Sultan's did not waver.[31]

In 17th-century England, there was a second wave of interest in the study of Arabic science and Islamic philosophy. Arabic manuscripts were considered the key to a treasure house of ancient knowledge, which led to the founding of Arabic chairs at Oxford and Cambridge Universities, where Arabic was taught. A large collection of Arabic manuscripts were acquired, collected in places such as the Bodleian Library at Oxford. These Arabic manuscripts were sought after by natural philosophers for their research in subjects such as observational astronomy or mathematics, and also encompassed subjects ranging from science, religion, and medicine, to typography and garden plants.[32]

Besides scientific and philosophical literature, works of Arabic fictional literature were also translated into Latin and English during the 17th and 18th centuries. The most famous of these was the One Thousand and One Nights (Arabian Nights), which was first translated into English in 1706 and has since then had a profound influence on English literature. Another famous work was Ibn Tufail's philosophical novel[33][34] Hayy ibn Yaqdhan, which was translated into Latin as Philosophus Autodidactus by Edward Pococke the Younger in 1671 and then into English by Simon Ockley in 1708. The English translation of Hayy ibn Yaqdhan, set on a desert island, may have inspired Daniel Defoe to write Robinson Crusoe, considered the first novel in English, in 1719.[35][36][37][38] Later translated literary works include Layla and Majnun and Ibn al-Nafis' Theologus Autodidactus.

By the time of Union with Scotland in 1707, only small numbers of Muslims were living in England. The first large group of Muslims to arrive, in the 18th century, were lascars (sailors) recruited from the Indian subcontinent (largely from the Bengal region) to work for the British East India Company, most of whom settled down and took local wives.[39] Due to the majority being lascars, the earliest Muslim communities were found in port towns. Naval cooks also came, many of them from the Sylhet Division of what is now Bangladesh. One of the most famous early Bengali Muslim immigrants to England was Sake Dean Mahomet, a captain of the British East India Company who in 1810 founded London's first Indian restaurant, the Hindoostane Coffee House. He is also reputed for introducing shampoo and therapeutic massage to the United Kingdom.

Demography and ethnic background


According to the 2011 Census, 2.7 million Muslims live in England and Wales where they form 5.0% of the population.[2]

The settlements with large number of Muslims are Bradford, Luton, Blackburn, Birmingham, London and Dewsbury. There are also high numbers in High Wycombe, Slough, Leicester, Derby, Manchester, Liverpool and the mill towns of Northern England

.The local authorities with a Muslim population greater than 10 percent in 2001 were:


  • London Borough of Tower Hamlets 36.4% 71,389
  • London Borough of Newham 24.3% 59,293
  • Blackburn with Darwen 19.4% 26,674
  • City of Bradford 16.1% 75,188
  • London Borough of Waltham Forest 15.1% 32,902
  • Luton 14.6% 26,963
  • Birmingham 14.3% 139,771
  • High Wycombe 14.1%, 9,708
  • London Borough of Hackney 13.8% 27,908
  • London Borough of Enfield 13.5% 37,388
  • Pendle 13.4% 11,988
  • Slough 13.4% 15,897
  • London Borough of Brent 12.3% 32,290
  • London Borough of Redbridge 11.9% 28,487
  • City of Westminster 11.8% 21,346
  • London Borough of Camden 11.6% 22,906
  • London Borough of Haringey 11.3% 24,371
  • Metropolitan Borough of Oldham 11.1% 24,039
  • Leicester 11.0% 30,885
  • London Borough of Ealing 10.3% 31,033
  • Kirklees 10.1% 39,312

Most large cities have one area that is a majority Muslim even if the rest of the city has a fairly small Muslims population; see, for example, Harehills in Leeds. In addition, it is possible to find small areas that are almost entirely Muslim: for example, Savile Town in Dewsbury.[42]

In September 2009, the ONS published information showing that Mohammed (or variations of it) was the third most popular boys' name in England and Wales.[43]

Some 38% of England's Muslims live in London, where 1,012,823 identified as Muslim in 2011 representing 12.4% of London's population of 8,173,941.[2]

Ethnic groups


Pakistanis

The single largest group of Muslims in England and Wales are of Pakistani descent. Pakistanis from Mirpur District were one of the first South Asian Muslim communities to permanently settle in the United Kingdom, arriving in Birmingham and Bradford in the late 1930s. Immigration from Mirpur grew from the late 1950s, accompanied by immigration from other parts of Pakistan especially from Punjab which included cities like Sialkot, Jhelum, Gujar Khan and Gujrat and also from the north-west Punjab including the chhachhi pathans from Attock District, and some from villages of Ghazi, Nowshera and Peshwar. There is also a fairly large Pakistani community from Kenya and Uganda found in London. People of Pakistani extraction are particularly notable in West Midlands (Birmingham), West Yorkshire (Bradford), London (Waltham Forest, Newham), Lancashire/Greater Manchester, and several industrial towns like Luton, Slough, High Wycombe and Oxford.

Bangladeshis

People of Bangladeshi descent are one of the largest Muslim communities (after Pakistanis), 16.8% of Muslims in England and Wales are of Bangladeshi descent, the ethnic group in the UK with the largest proportion of people following a single religion, being 92% Muslim.[46] Majority of these Muslim come from the Sylhet region of Bangladesh, mainly concentrated in London (Tower Hamlets and Newham), Luton, Birmingham and Oldham. The Bangladeshi Muslim community in London form 24% of the Muslim population, larger than any other ethnic group.[47]

Initial limited mosque availability meant that prayers were conducted in small rooms of council flats until the 1980s when more and larger facilities became available. Some synagogues and community buildings were turned into mosques and existing mosques began to expand their buildings. This process has continued down to the present day with the East London Mosque recently expanding into a large former car park where the London Muslim Centre is now used for prayers, recreational facilities and housing.[48][49] Most people regard themselves as part of the ummah, and their identity based on their religion rather than their ethnic group.[50] Cultural aspects of a 'Bengali Islam' are seen as superstition and as un-Islamic.[50] The identity is far stronger in comparison to the native land. Younger Bangladeshis are more involved in Islamist activities and movement groups, whereas the older generation practice with Islamic rituals mixed with the Bengali culture.[citation needed] Many Bangladeshi women wear the burqa and many young women or girls also wear the headscarf.[citation needed]

There are groups which are active throughout Bangladeshi communities such as The Young Muslim Organization. It is connected to the Islamic Forum Europe, associated with the East London Mosque and the London Muslim Centre – all of which have connections with the Bangladesh Islamic party, the Jamaat-e-Islami (linked with some community mosques, which also linked with the Dawat-e-Islami).[citation needed] Other groups also attract a few people, the Hizb ut-Tahrir – which calls for the Khilafah (caliphate) and influences by publishing annual magazines, and lectures through mainly political concepts,[51] and the other which is a movement within Sunni Islam is the Salafi – who view the teachings of the first generations as the correct one,[52] and appeals to younger Muslims as a way to differentiate themselves towards their elders.[48][53] Other large groups include another Sunni movement, the Barelwi – mainly of a Fultoli movement (led by Abdul Latif Chowdhury in Bangladesh), and the Tablighi Jamaat – which is a missionary and revival movement,[54] and avoids political attention. All these groups work to stimulate Islamic identity among local Bengalis or Muslims and particularly focus on the younger members of the communities.[49][55][56]

Indians

8% of Muslims in England and Wales are of Indian descent, especially those who are from Gujarat, West Bengal, Telangana and Kerala. The Gujarati Muslims from Surat and Bharuch districts in India started to arrive from the 1930s, settling in the towns of Dewsbury and Batley in Yorkshire and parts of Lancashire. There are large numbers of Gujarati Muslims in Dewsbury, Blackburn (inc. Darwen), Bolton, Preston, Nuneaton, Gloucester and London (Newham, Waltham Forest and Hackney). Immigration of Muslims into UK, was primarily started off by Indians during the colonial rule.

Somalis

The United Kingdom, with 43,532 Somalia-born residents in 2001,[57] and an estimated 101,000 in 2008,[58] is home to the largest Somali community in Europe. A 2009 estimate by Somali community organisations puts the Somali population figure at 90,000 residents.[59] Although most Somalis in the UK are recent arrivals, the first Somali immigrants were seamen and traders who arrived and settled in port cities in the late 19th century.[59] Established Somali communities are found in Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool and London, and newer ones have formed in Leicester, Manchester and Sheffield.[60][61] It has been estimated that between 7,000 to 9,000 Somalis live in Liverpool.[62][63]

Turks

Turks first began to emigrate in large numbers from the island of Cyprus for work and then again when Turkish Cypriots were forced to leave their homes during the Cyprus conflict.[citation needed] Turks then began to come from Turkey for economic reasons. Recently, smaller groups of Turks have begun to immigrate to the United Kingdom from other European countries.[64] As of 2011, there is a total of about 500,000 people of Turkish origin in the UK,[65] made up of approximately 150,000 Turkish nationals and about 300,000 Turkish Cypriots.[66] Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a growing number of ethnic Turks with Bulgarian, German, Greek, Macedonian, and Romanian citizenship who have also migrated to the United Kingdom.[66] The majority live in London.

White (European)

The 2001 census stated that there were 179,733 Muslims who described themselves as 'white' in the 2001 census. 65% of white Muslims described themselves as "other white", and would likely have originated from locations such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Adyghe, Chechnya, Albania, Macedonia and Turkey. The remainder of white Muslims identified themselves as White British and White Irish.

Nigerian

There are also a number of Muslim immigrants in England that arrived from Nigeria. Nigerian Muslims in the UK are represented by several community organizations, including the Nigeria Muslim forum, which is affiliated with the Council of Nigerian Muslim Organisations in UK and Ireland (CNMO) and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB).[67]

Maghrebis

Although data is short, findings indicate Maghrebis make up a substantial community in Europe and England. Britain has long ties with Maghrebis, through contact with the Moors. Nevertheless, Britain has a far lower count of Maghrebis in comparison to France, the Netherlands and Spain, where the majority of Muslims are Maghrebi.[68]


Position in society


Poverty

According to analysis based on the 2001 census, Muslims in England face poor standards of housing, poorer levels of education and are more vulnerable to long-term illness,[73] and that Muslims in the UK had the highest rate of unemployment, the poorest health, the most disability and fewest educational qualifications among religious groups.[74] The figures were, to some extent, explained by the fact that Muslims were the least well-established group, having the youngest age profile.[74]

Conversely, there are estimated to be around 10,000 British Muslim millionaires.[75] There is a growing substantial British Muslim business community, led by multi-millionaires such as Sir Anwar Pervez.[76]

Education

On a study of more than 13,000 young people, approximately 53% of British Muslims choose to attend university.[77] This is higher than the figure for Christians (45%) and Atheists (32%), but lower than the figure of Hindus and Sikhs, who score 77% and 63% respectively.[77]

Muslim schools regularly outperform those of other faiths. For example, in 2008, 86.5% of pupils attending Muslim schools achieved five GCSEs, compared to a figure of 72.8% of Roman Catholic schools and 64.5% of Secular schools.[78]

Discrimination

There have been cases of threats,[79] one alleged fatal attack,[80] and non-fatal attacks on Muslims and on Muslim targets, including attacks on Muslim graves[81] and mosques.[82] In January 2010, a report from the University of Exeter's European Muslim Research Centre noted that the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes has increased, ranging from "death threats and murder to persistent low-level assaults, such as spitting and name-calling," for which the media and politicians have been blamed with fueling anti-Muslim hatred.[83][84][85]

The British media has been criticised for propagating negative stereotypes of Muslims and fueling anti-Muslim prejudice.[86] In 2006, British cabinet ministers were criticised for helping to "unleash a public anti-Muslim backlash" by blaming the Muslim community over issues of integration despite a study commissioned by the Home Office on white and Asian-Muslim youths demonstrating otherwise: that Asian-Muslim youths "are in fact the most tolerant of all" and that white British youths "have far more intolerant attitudes," concluding that intolerance from the white British community was a greater "barrier to integration."[87][88] Another survey by Gallup in 2009 also found that the Muslim community claimed to feel more patriotic about Britain than the general British population,[89][90] while another survey found that Muslims assert that they support the role of Christianity in British life more so than Christians themselves.[91] In January 2010, the British Social Attitudes Survey found that the general British public "is far more likely to hold negative views of Muslims than of any other religious group," with "just one in four" feeling "positively about Islam," and a "majority of the country would be concerned if a mosque was built in their area, while only 15 per cent expressed similar qualms about the opening of a church."[92] The "scapegoating" of Muslims by the media and politicians in the 21st century has been compared in the media to the rise of antisemitism in the early 20th century.[93]

After high-profile cases in England, allegations of religiously-motivated paedophilia by Muslims has been described as the "most significant right-wing propaganda technique".[94] An ITV investigation in 2013 found that of 56 mosques surveyed (pre-dominantly South Asian), 18 were willing to perform a forced marriage of a minor, whilst around 66% "refused outright".[95]

Views on Islam in London

A poll by the London Evening Standard in December 2007, which surveyed a range of the capital's communities, including Muslims, found that 49% of those surveyed considered Islam as generally intolerant, while 44% saw it as generally tolerant. A total of 51% felt that Muslims were isolated from other communities to a degree, with 12% believing that the majority of them were. A large majority (81% to 7%), believed that the most holy day in Islam, Eid, should not be celebrated by the British state, and 88% opposed Muslim teachers covering their faces at work. A majority (55%) wanted immigration of Muslims to be cut, with 33% wanting it cut greatly. Islam was seen as the cause of the 7 July attacks on the city in 2005 by 52% of the population, with 35% seeing it as a major factor. Views from the survey which were not in line with the largely negative views included that 71% would vote for a Muslim Mayor of London if they were the best candidate (with 16% against such a vote).[96]

Notable mosques


  • Fazl Mosque, the first mosque in London, built in 1926 and residence of the Caliph Mirza Masroor Ahmad - AMJ
  • Jamea Masjid in Preston
  • Shah Jahan Mosque in Woking was the first purpose built mosque in Britain
  • Markazi mosque in Dewsbury
  • Manchester Central Mosque
  • Al-Rahma mosque in Liverpool
  • Birmingham Central Mosque
  • East London Mosque
  • Leeds Grand Mosque
  • Finsbury Park Mosque in London
  • Al Mahdi Mosque in Bradford - AMJ
  • Abbey Mills Mosque in London
  • Medina Mosque in Sheffield
  • Darul Barakaat Mosque in Birmingham - AM